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Prolegomenon
Parallel to Gordon Childe’s (1925) notions of ran-
ked societies and associated farmer’s and crafts-
man’s ‘personalities’ and male and female ‘person-
ages’, Marcel Mauss (1925) put the concept of the
person on the anthropological and sociological agen-
da in France. The person appears as what he called
a ‘total social fact’, a specific complex of a particular
society, and what was later recognised as the West-
ern conceptualisation of the person as a unique and
indivisible unity. Mauss began by distinguishing be-
tween the terms ‘person’ and ‘individual’ and be-
tween the social concept of the person and any hu-
man being’s self-awareness, which he regarded as
universal. He contrasted consciousness of the self, an
individuality (compounded of an awareness of the
body and spirit) with the social concept of a person.
The person, he suggested, is a compound of rights,
and moral responsibility. He later recognised the ar-
chetypes in the classical Greek perception of ‘the
actor behind the mask’, and in the development of
Roman law, which ‘first dissolved the distribution of
personhood on the basis of clan genealogies and re-
constituted it on the basis of the citizen’s role in the
Republic’. The later development within Christian
institutions of religion and morality leads to the
emergence ‘of a system in which the status and at-
tributes of personhood are attached to an inner prin-
ciple of monitoring and control: conscience and con-
sciousness’ (La Fontaine 1985; Hunter, Saunders
1995).
Personne morale and bounded, indivisible and
autonomous individuals
In a seminal essay ‘A category of the human mind.
The notion of person, the notion of self’1 Mauss
([1938]1985) provides ‘a summary catalogue’ of the
concepts of person that had been assumed ‘from
extremely ancient history to that of our own times’.
He proposed an evolutionary trajectory from the
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‘role’ (personnage) to the ‘moral person’ (personne
morale). The concept of the person, he said in the
opening paragraph, “originated and slowly develo-
ped over many centuries and through numerous
vicissitudes, so that even today it is still imprecise,
delicate, fragile, one requiring further elabora-
tion”.
Mauss began with the ‘role-player’ (personnage), or-
ganised around ascribed roles in a bounded tribal
society of totemic clans, each clan having a fixed list
of names transmitted by recognised procedures, the
bearers of a name being reincarnations of their pre-
decessors back to mythical times. They “installed in
their settlements a whole social and religious sys-
tem where, in a vast exchange of rights, goods and
services, property, dances, ceremonies, privileges
and ranks, persons as well as groups give satisfac-
tion to one another. We see very clearly how, from
classes and clans, ‘human persons’ adjust to one
another and how, from these, the gestures of the
actors in a drama fit together. Here all the actors
are theoretically the sum total of all free men. But
this time the drama is more than an aesthetic per-
formance. It is religious, and at the same time it is
cosmic, mythological, social and personal” (ibid.
7–8).
The membership of a clan and the sets of roles with-
in the clan thus conceptualise a person and its social
identity. It is the life of the clan which constitutes
agency, and personhood (or social identity) is sym-
bolised by the ‘ceremonial masks which an actor
wears in sacred dramas’. The ‘role’ played by the in-
dividual is extended to the whole group and, society
as a whole arrives at the notion of ‘role-player’.
However, all members of a clan are not necessarily
personages, and it is not clear whether people who
are not personnages are ‘non-persons’ in the same
sense as social outcasts.
He continued with the notion of ‘person’ (personne)
that he recognised in classical Greek and Latin soci-
eties. The institutions of “the same kind as ceremo-
nies of clans, masks and paints with which the ac-
tors bedeck themselves according to the names
they bear” has remained, but the personne has be-
came “more than an organisational fact, more
than a name or a right to assume a role and a rit-
ual mask. It is a basic fact of law”. It has become
synonymous with the “true nature of the individual
... moreover, the right to the persona had been es-
tablished”, and only slaves (‘servus non habet per-
sonam’) were excluded from it. And “to its juridical
meaning is ... added a moral one, a sense of be-
ing conscious, independent, autonomous, free and
responsible”; the conscious moral person was born
(ibid. 15–17). In the Latin perception of persona,
the emphasis moved from masks to the privileges
of those with a right to masks – to the patres which
represent their ancestors – to anyone with ances-
tors, a cognomen and family property. The notion
of the person as a possessor of rights, a group from
which only slaves were excluded, thus appeared.
The Stoics had introduced the perception of the per-
son as a kind of private prosopon, and contributed
a notion of the person as a moral fact that embeds
a concept of moral conscience in the juridical con-
cept of a right.
However, it is only with the coming of Christianity
and after the rise of the awareness of religious po-
wer that “the true metaphysical foundations of
‘personne morale’ (‘moral subject’) became fully
established”. The perception of the transition from
the notion of ‘persona’ to the notion of man, that of
the ‘human person (personne)’ Mauss suggested was
introduced by the Council of Nicaea pronouncement
“Unitas in tres personas, una persona in duas na-
tura’ ... Unity in three persons – of the Trinity –
unity of the two natures of Christ [i.e., one person
with two natures]. It is from the notion of the ‘one’
that the notion of the ‘person’ (personne) was crea-
ted – I believe that it will long remain so – for the
divine persons, but at the same time for the hu-
man person, substance and mode, body and soul,
consciousness and act” (ibid. 20).
The main focus of Mauss’s essay is the distinction
between the concepts of the individual and the per-
son. By the individual, he means ‘the unstructured
biological and psychological human being’, where-
as the person is embedded in social organisations
and cultural institutions, and relates to positions,
statuses, rights, duties, virtues and traits through
which societies organise the lives of their members.
He argued against a simplistic conceptual equalisa-
tion of the person and individual by describing vari-
ous societies in which not all individuals are per-
sons, and in which those who are, do not possess
personhood as individuals. In clan societies, persons
are special constructs of rights, statuses, abilities and
traits which are attached to trans-individual entities
such as totems, naming systems, masks, ritual genea-
logies etc. These entities are responsible for a dis-
tribution of personhood to individuals that may not
be universal and permanent. Some individuals ob-
tain their persons through ritual practices in which
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they reincarnate the person of an ancestor or spirit.
This practice was associated with public rituals and
ecstatic dance, and was not an expression of their
(inner) selves.
Mauss took the ‘modern Western’ perception of the
person as self to be the marker of a cultural form in
which personhood is elaborated and ascribed to in-
dividuals. He suggests that our persona (e.g., rights,
duties, abilities, virtues and traits) is inalienable and
rooted in the conscience and consciousness of each
individual. This perception relates to the emergence
and set of transformations of the notion of the sub-
ject that appeared in the contexts of law and mora-
lity. The first transformation relates to the emer-
gence of the idea that person(hood) is a status that
should be attached to all individuals. Mauss attribu-
tes this idea to an archetypal mode of distributing
names, genealogies, masks and insignia of person-
hood, together with their attached rights, obliga-
tions and statuses in the Roman period. It was Ro-
man law, he argues, that first dissolved the distribu-
tion of personhood on the basis of clan genealo-
gies, reconstituting it on the basis of the citizen’s
role in the Res Publica Romanorum. The introduc-
tion of a new ‘universalizing regulatory institution’
(Hunter, Saunders 1995.73) resulted in the distri-
bution of personhood to individuals and in the ap-
pearance of the legal person. Only slaves were ex-
cluded from this modus operandi of distributing
personhood to individuals.
The second set of transformations occurred in insti-
tutions of religion and morality. To be a legal per-
son is not yet to be a self, as the attributes of the in-
dividual’s legal persona delimited by a set of legal
rights, positions and duties have not been attached
to an inner principle responsible for their conduct.
Mauss notes that in the context of religious radica-
lism and economic progress, the Stoics first develo-
ped a language of conscience that relates to the pra-
ctice of establishing an inner regulation of the pub-
lic attributes of personhood, and that the Puritan
ethic constituted a partial dissolution of a system in
which individuals acquired their religious persona
through the distributive rituals of the church. As Max
Weber (1950.104) puts it, “in what was for the man
of the age of the Reformation the most important
thing in life, his eternal salvation, he was forced to
follow his path alone to meet a destiny which had
been decreed for him from eternity. No one could
help him. No priest, for the chosen one can under-
stand the word of God only in his own heart”. How-
ever, for Weber, it was through the ‘doctrine of pre-
destination’ and dissemination of the ‘set of ethical
techniques and practices’ – labour being one of them2
– that individuals came to conceive of themselves as
objects of their own ethical attention and learned to
conduct their lives in the absence of collective gua-
rantees of salvation (Hunter, Saunders 1995).
Mauss’s perception of the role of social settings in
the formation of the self and the evolutionary tra-
jectory from the personage to the personne morale
are related to Weber’s ‘life orders’ and the evolu-
tion of authorities that he identified as ‘traditional’,
‘charismatic’ and ‘legal-rational’. Weber distingui-
shed between class and status, which he identified
as the primary basis of social dynamics. While class
is based solely on economic power, status is deter-
mined by ‘life orders’ that produce particular types
of personhood (Stillman 2010.51). The ‘life orders’
thus became recognised as sets of daily practices
and techniques in which the status and attributes
of Christian personhood are attached to an inner
principle of monitoring and self-control, to consci-
ence and consciousness. Paul du Gay (2007.53) no-
ted that “Weber’s Puritan internalizes in the form
of an ever watchful inner conscience the public
norm embodied in the predestinarian doctrine or
code, rather than externalizing that norm in reli-
gious ceremonies and images or, for that matter,
in a legal system”. The question for Weber was thus
not “how well a particular persona equates with
the truth of human experience or subjectivity in
general, but how one gets individuals willing and
competent to bear that form of personhood which
fits the circumstances of a given sphere of life ...
Like Mauss, Weber is concerned with constructing
a practical account of the ways in which individu-
als learn to conduct themselves as certain sorts of
person, an account that shows the actual ‘conducts
of life’ involved and the technical conditions for
producing and deploying them” (ibid. 54).
For Michel Foucault (1990.10, 11) ‘life orders’ and
‘ethical techniques’ are synonymous with ‘arts of
existence’ and ‘techniques of the self’. He suggested
that “those intentional and voluntary actions by
which men not only set themselves rules of con-
2 The old Puritan doctrine states that “works are not the cause, but only the means of knowing one’s state of grace” and that “cal-
ling and the premium as placed upon ascetic conduct was bound directly to influence the development of a capitalistic way
of life” (Weber 1950.141, 166).
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duct, but also seek to transform themselves, to
change themselves in their singular being, and to
make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain
aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic crite-
ria”. Individuals have been ‘subjectified’ through a
process of ‘self-problematisation’, and the practices
on the basis of which these ‘problematizations’ are
formed that can be seen as ‘inventions for taking an
interest in oneself as the subject of one’s own con-
duct’. There are different ways, he continues, “to
‘conduct oneself’ morally, different ways for the
acting individual to operate, not just as an agent,
but as an ethical subject of this action” (ibid. 26).
Every morality thus comprises two elements: a code
of morality and forms of subjectivisation, which are
differently balanced in different cultures. The archa-
eological dimension is embedded in the actual forms
of subjectivity which appeared in different contexts
at different points in time, he suggests. The ‘tech-
niques of the self’ thus resulted in the ‘Western’ per-
ception of individuals that conceive of themselves
as objects of their own ethical attention. In the mo-
dern West, the attributes of personhood thus have
become attached to the conscience and conscious-
ness of individuals, because individuals have adop-
ted techniques for relating to themselves as the sub-
jects of their own conduct and capacities. As Mauss
(1985.19, 20) suggests, “our own notion of the hu-
man person is still basically the Christian one” in
which the modern conception of ‘self’ is built on the
conception of a unity comprised of “substance and
mode, body and soul, consciousness and act”.
Just before Mauss conceptualised the distinction be-
tween individual and person, Alfred Radcliffe-Brown
(1922.284) introduced into British social anthropo-
logy the notion of ‘social personality’, which he re-
cognised in the social structure of the Andaman islan-
ders. He relates the ‘social personality’ to the sum of
‘those qualities of a person by which he is able to af-
fect the society’. In other words, his ‘social value’ de-
pends on his (individual) social status. Much later, he
made a distinction between the individual and per-
son, stating that “every human being living in so-
ciety is two things: he is an individual and he is
also a person. As an individual he is a biological
organism … as a person [he] is a complex of social
relationships” (Radcliffe-Brown 1952.193–194).
The statement has been read as a direct adaptation
of Mauss’s concept of the personne morale (Fortes
1973. 287).
However, it was Kenneth E. Read (1955) who first
emphasised the basic Maussian premise that the per-
ception of the individual is exclusive to Western
thought. The Gahuku-Gama people in the Highlands
of Papua New Guinea, he argued, lack a concept of
person. There is “no essential separation of the in-
dividual from the social pattern; social roles and
social status are not distinguished from the indivi-
duals who enact them” (ibid. 276).
Individual and dividual aspects of person(hood)
Meyer Fortes (1973; 1987) took the opposite view,
suggesting that all societies have (had) a concept of
person. He argued that the notion of the person in
the Maussian sense “is intrinsic to the very nature
and structure of human society and human social
behaviour everywhere” (Fortes 1987.253). His ap-
proach was based on the distinction between the in-
dividual and person, and on the conceptualisation
of the self as the connection between the ‘inner man’
and the ‘outer’, socially formed, person. The person,
he suggested, is culturally defined, socially genera-
ted and conferred on the individual. Persons are,
however, “kept aware of who they are and where
they fit into society by criteria of age, sex, and de-
scent, and by other indices of status, through act-
ing in accordance with these norms” (ibid. 282).
It was the Tallensi ethnography in West Africa which
allowed Fortes to premise society as the source of
personhood, which can confer it on any object it
chooses, whether human or non-human, living or
dead, animate or inanimate, material or imagined,
and above all, on both individuals and on collectivi-
ties. However, animals are not persons; only particu-
lar animals can be invested with personhood and as-
sociated with ‘the particular collective person, that
is, the clan whose dead elders rise up again’. In this
context, the “personhood comes thus to be in its es-
sence externally oriented. Self awareness means,
in the first place, awareness of oneself as a person-
ne morale rather than as an idiosyncratic indi-
vidual. The moral conscience is externally valida-
ted, being vested, ultimately, in the ancestors, on
the other side of the ritual curtain. The soul, image
as it is of the focal element of individuality, is pro-
jected on to material objects that will outlast the
living person. Person is perceived as a microcosm
of the social order, incorporating its distinctive
principles of structure and norms of value and im-
plementing a pattern of life that finds satisfaction
in its consonance with the constraints and realities
... of the social and material world” (ibid. 285–286).
Fortes suggests that Tallensi person(hood) is dividual
and partible. Full person status is perceived as some-
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thing attained gradually over the course of a life-
time. Adulthood is the first step in a linear ritual tra-
jectory which the person completes only at death,
when it becomes fully incorporated into the total so-
ciety by accessing the ancestry. Fortes describes the
Tallensi person as primarily defined by roles and
statuses, and as constituted of detachable parts ex-
ternal to it, but shared by both humans and other li-
ving entities (see also Comaroff, Comaroff 2001;
Tsékénis 2011). The person (individual) and the
corporate group are images of one another on a dif-
ferent scale, as ‘the descent-based collectivities are
perpetual corporate bodies’ that replicate on the col-
lective level the model of the person on the indivi-
dual level. “Individual and collective are not mu-
tually exclusive but are rather two sides of the
same structural complex. The scheme of identifica-
tion employed for individual persons is the same
scheme of identification as serves to distinguish li-
neages and clans. The mechanics of this pattern is
obvious if we bear in mind that the individual per-
son is constantly obliged to be aware of himself
and to present himself as a member and represen-
tative of such a collective unit. In ceremonial sit-
uations, [e.g., funerals, sacrifices, and the rituals of
the ‘Great Festivals’] ... no matter what kind of tran-
sactions an individual or a group is engaged in, ...
the context of the collective interest is always pre-
sent. But the idea that a lineage is a collective per-
son because it is the perpetuation of its founding
ancestor in each of his descendants is seen in ot-
her ways too” (Fortes 1987.283).
Mauss’s interpretation of the Western notion of the
person as self as the sign of a particular cultural ela-
boration of personhood and a particular cultural
mode of distributing personhood to individuals be-
came recognised in anthropology as the “notion of
the ‘unitary subject’ that is “reflected in cultural
(ideological) conceptions of the person derived
from Cartesiam metaphysics and bourgeois (capi-
talist) political theory, which depicts the human
person as an isolated, asocial, bounded and homo-
genous entity” (Morris 2000.47). In archaeology, it
has been suggested similarly that “in the modern,
Western world, the human individual is concei-
ved of as a bounded, stable and independent enti-
ty, existing prior to and above the social relations
into which it enters. The notion of an autonomous
and transcendent self consciously shaping its own
destiny can of course be traced to the radical indi-
vidualism and liberal political theory of the eighte-
enth and nineteenth centuries” (Brück 2006.308).
The notion that the person is a homogeneous and
internally consistent entity is certainly not cross-cul-
turally shared. The initial perception of the self in
many societies involves an amalgamation of ele-
ments brought together through parenthood, mar-
riage, exchange and other interpersonal contacts. In-
deed, the ‘dividual self’ was introduced into anthro-
pology by McKim Marriott (1976) as an opposition to
the indivisible person. He noted that “persons sin-
gle actors are not thought in South Asia to be ‘in-
dividual’, that is, indivisible, bounded units, as they
are in much of Western social and psychological
theory, as well as in common sense. Instead, it ap-
pears that persons are generally thought by South
Asians to be ‘dividual’ or divisible. To exist, divi-
dual persons absorb heterogeneous material influ-
ences. They must also give out from themselves
particles of their own coded substances, essences,
residues, or other active influences that may then
reproduce in others something of the nature of the
persons in whom they have originated ... What goes
on between actors are the same connected proces-
ses of mixing and separation that go on within
actors. Actors’ particular natures are thought to
be the results as well as causes of their particular
actions (karma). Varied codes of action or codes
of conduct (dharma) are thought to be naturally
embodied in actors and otherwise substantialized
in the flow of things that pass among actors ... Pro-
per separability of action from actor, of code from
substance … that pervades both Western philosophy
and Western common sense … is generally absent:
code and substance ... cannot have separate exis-
tences in this world of constituted things as concei-
ved by most South Asians” (ibid. 109–10).
‘Dividuals’ are thus dividual and ‘multiply-authored’
composites, and their components originate outside
of the person. Marriott relates these to ‘substance-
codes’ transmitted between bodies, persons, and cas-
tes. Bodily substance and codes of conduct mingle
within bodies, but are inseparable from the ‘outside’
world. The coded substances are blood, cooked food,
alcohol, soil, alms and even knowledge. They conti-
nually circulate and are transformed through social
interactions. The exchange of substances (giving and
receiving) affects a person internally, and influen-
ces the whole of their social identity, including gen-
der and caste. Actions enjoined by these embodied
codes are thought of as transforming the substan-
ces in which they are embodied. When a woman
marries, her body is considered to be transformed,
and so too, is her code of conduct. The ‘code’ for a
particular group or family unit is thought to be car-
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ried in the bodily substance shared by persons be-
longing to that group. Throughout life, each person
is internally divided and composed of many differ-
ent coded substances at once that can be extended
from the person through exchanges and given to ot-
hers. The continuous mixing and separation of ele-
ments occurs through processes of parenthood, mar-
riage, trade, feasts, the exchange of services and
knowledge and other inter-personal contacts.
Parallel to Hindu ‘dividuals’, in the New Guinea High-
lands, Marylin Strathern (1987; 1988) identified
the ‘sociocentric’ Melanesian dividual and partible
personhoods as alternatives to ‘egocentric’ Western
indivisible, individual personhoods. Each person is
a composite formed of relations with a plurality of
other persons. The person can be considered a divi-
dual being, as a composite formed of relations with
a plurality of other persons. Melanesian persons are,
she argued “as dividually as they are individually
conceived. They contain a generalized sociality
within. Indeed, persons are frequently constructed
as the plural and composite site of the relation-
ships that produced them. The singular person can
be imagined as a social microcosm. This premise
is particularly significant for the attention given to
images of relations contained within the mater-
nal body. By contrast, the kinds of collective action
that might be identified by an outside observer in
a male cult performance or group organization,
involving numbers of persons, often presents an
image of unity. This image is created out of inter-
nal homogeneity, a process of de-pluralization,
manifested less as the realization of generalized
and integrative principles of organization itself
and more as the realization of particular identities
called into play through unique events and indivi-
dual accomplishments” (Strathern 1988.13).
In this perception, a person is a product of the gifts,
contributions, or detachments of others. Persons are
regarded “as composed of gendered substances,
such as father’s bone [e.g., semen] and mother’s
menstrual blood, plus lifetimes of donations of em-
bodied and non-substantial labour by other kin
and relatives such as food, magical knowledge, ce-
remonial wealth, land, etc.”. These personal gifts
should be reciprocated, for example, “since my mo-
ther contributed womb blood to me during concep-
tion and gestation, at appropriate later points I
am obliged to give her analogous parts of myself
acquired from still other persons” (Mosko 2010.
218).
Thus the “the widespread ‘identification’ of wo-
men with the growing crops or with the pigs that
they nurture is to be juxtaposed to those rather
few contexts in which women engage in (exter-
nal) collective activity. The maternal relationship
between a woman and her products appears in an
image of internal multiplication and replication.
The image is one of a body and its as yet undeta-
ched parts. It is the mother, as it were, who grows.
Once grown, however, the detached things (food
and children) can be used in either a mediating or
no mediating manner” (Strathern 1988.250). In-
deed, “identification of the crops with the woman’s
person lasts only as long as they are also in expli-
cit relation to the ground with which her husband
(or son or sometimes brother) is identified. The
link between herself and the crop is via her parti-
cular concrete work. One could suggest an analogy
here with men’s contrivances in ceremonial ex-
change. The unitary connection the identification
of the growing plants with the woman who watch-
es over them is a deliberate achievement in this
sphere. It operates to a precise effect to bring the
plants to maturation. Once the crops are taken out
of the ground, they are no longer the woman’s
own. Instead they are reactivated like the pigs that
return to the household in terms of their multiple
social sources. (The plants cared for by the wife
were nourished by the husband’s work on his clan
land.) Thus a husband has irrefutable claims on a
woman’s harvested food, where he would never
help himself to her planted gardens” (ibid. 165). It
is that “men thus grow women. And the men do it
through the effort they apply to prepare the land to
yield food. Food is the product of a relation (hus-
band’s and wife’s work), but in its encompassing
male origin, its source in the soil, can also be
thought of as paternal. A cross-sex relation is con-
verted to a unique (same-sex) capacity. And this is
the sense in which clans grow persons on its soil,
sometimes referred to as its bones. Hence the
‘grease’ in clan territory that nourishes plants and
people is food in male form, though the term itself
refers to semen and breast milk alike” (ibid. 265).
A person’s composition constantly changes as they
both attach others’ contributions to themselves and
detach personal tokens and capacities to be attached
to others. The transactions compose persons, and re-
lations create a chain of sequential reciprocities ‘as
so many capacities for future agentive action’. Thus
for “children to be produced, the semen that coa-
gulates to form a fetus must be separated from the
encasing semen substance of the person’s body
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[i.e., that within the collectivising domesticity, the
circulation and transaction of semen contributes di-
rectly to the ‘growth of the brother’s and sister’s
body tissue, and cannot be further transmitted’] ...
What enables them to ‘produce’ children is the se-
paration which then becomes conceivable be-
tween the spouse’s internal constitutions (the re-
lation which makes each body both container and
contained). Although the husband is thought also
to contribute to the wife’s body (the container),
this is only a contribution. Her body is made lar-
gely of paternal material; instead he transmits his
own partible substance that becomes contained
within the wife’s cavity as an entity separate from
her encasing paternal body. Given that it is milk,
rather than blood, which is the Sambia female ver-
sion of male substance, there is a parallel between
the emptying of the male body through insemina-
tion and female breast feeding. While getting rid of
milk or semen may underline the vessel-like nature
of the body, blood by contrast does not have the
property of further flow. It is simply discarded, and
in being discarded it is ‘bad’, in contradistinction
to the vital filling and emptying of the semen sac/
womb/breast” (ibid. 216–217).
Strathern (1988.15) argues that gatherings and cere-
monies bring together a whole clan as a dividual
person, so that “the bringing together of many per-
sons is just like the bringing together of one”. It is
suggested that clan and person have parallel compo-
sitions and conditions of personhood (see Fowler
2004.28). Indeed, they continuously move between
being one person with many relations (dividual),
and being presented as one of a pair in a relation-
ship (partible). Thus “the condition of multiple con-
stitution, the person composed of diverse relations,
also makes the person a partible entity: an agent
can dispose of parts, or act as a part. Thus ‘women’
move in marriage as parts of clans; thus ‘men’ cir-
culate objectified parts of themselves among them-
selves” (Strathern 1988.324–325). However, the clan
and the person are also internally differentiated in
encompassing a series of distinct parts usually dis-
parate from each other (including the people with-
in it, but also pigs and shell goods). But at the same
time, we must note that the “exchange of detached,
partible things stands in apposition to the flow of
internal (lineal) substance within a single wife-ex-
changing or wife-receiving unit. Meat, women, and
shells flow in exchange across relationships not in-
ternally unified by substance … The conventional
separation between internal and external rela-
tions is tantamount to the personification of the
body itself. For the Melanesian image of the body
as composed of relations is the effect of its objecti-
fication as a person. In the partibility of its exten-
sions into relations beyond itself and in the inter-
nal relations that compose its substance, the body
consequently appears as a result of people’s ac-
tions” (ibid. 207–208).
In the context of the ‘substantialization of attributes
of persons and things’, Cecilia Busby (1997.274–
276) argues for a distinction in the conceptualisa-
tion of persons between Melanesia and South
India. Both have been characterised as ‘dividuals’ in
contrast to the ‘individuals’ of the West, and both
have similarly been seen as ‘making connections
through the exchange of parts of the person, follo-
wing Mauss’s (1925) model of gift exchange’. She
suggests that the perception of Melanesian bodies as
internally divided creates ‘an apparent homology
between internal and external relations or parts’.
The person composed of relations appears to ‘extend
beyond the skin boundary’ and includes objects and
persons considered to be objectifications of such re-
lations. In India, however, persons are not internal-
ly divided. They contain substances from both the
mother and father, but they are not ‘separably iden-
tifiable in the body’. Persons are ‘co-extensive with
their skin boundary’ and they are not ‘partible’, she
continues. The boundary of the body is fluid, and
substance can flow between persons, so that the per-
son can be considered as ‘permeable’. She thus ma-
kes a distinction between substance as ‘a flow from
a person’ and ‘substance as a part of a person’ and
a person ‘who is internally whole and permeable’
against those ‘who is internally divided and partible’.
Parallel to ‘permeable personhood’, Nurit Bird-David
(1999) introduced the concept of ‘relatedness’ that
she relates to the ‘totemic thought’ and animistic
practices of Nayaka forest-dwelling hunter-gatherers
of Tamil Nadu in South India. The construction of a
relational personhood is made ‘by producing and re-
producing sharing relationships with surrounding
beings, humans and others’. This allows them to
sense each other as “dividuated personalities, each
with a relatively persisting way of engaging with
others against the relative change involved in their
mutual engagement” (ibid. S72). Comments on this
paper introduced different perceptions of dividuals,
each associated with a different type of social rela-
tions: the Melanesian that ‘separate-while-connect-
ing’ and the Nayaka that absorb (ibid. S88). In ot-
her words, while south Indian dividuals ‘engage in
relations which integrate’, Melanesian dividuals ‘en-
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gage in relations which separate elements of their
selves and world’, and individuals ‘engage in rela-
tions which alienate’. In this perception, Melane-
sians are ‘separating parts of their person from each
other in order to keep up relations with others’.
Conversely, South Indian persons are ‘integrated
with other persons’ in terms of personal relations in
a way that ‘the two bodies have a shared boundary’
and so operate ‘as a single system’. Individuals are
thus interpreted ‘as alienated from each other and
from their world’, and to some extent even from
their bodies through their relations with one ano-
ther (Fowler 2001.140). Each of these modes of re-
lations refers to bodily conception and experience.
LiPuma (1998) suggests, however, that the Melane-
sian person, like persons everywhere, has both, in-
dividual and dividual ‘aspects of personhood’. He
argued against the classic distinction between (West-
ern) individuals as bounded indivisible entities pos-
sessing fixed innate attributes and engaging in rela-
tions of the capitalist possession of land, animals
and things, but being in constant opposition to so-
ciety, and dividuals as constituted in interaction
with others, inseparable from the gifts they give and
integrated within their world as a ‘microcosm of so-
ciety’. In his view, persons emerge from the tension
between dividual and individual relations. It is a
misunderstanding to assume either that the social
emerges from individual actions or that the indivi-
dual ever completely disappears by ‘virtue of indige-
nous forms of relational totalization’. To assume that
there exists an opposition between societies based
on substance and those based on relations (i.e., cul-
tures of dividual persons versus a Western world
of individuals), he continues, is not only to accept
Western ideological perceptions of the person, but
to use that ideology to construct the “Other as its
opposite image” (LiPuma 2001.132). The individu-
ality that is a defining feature of personhood should
not be equated with bourgeois individualism. Each
person thus negotiates a tension between dividual
and individual characteristics, and in all societies,
although embedded in different cultural and histo-
rical contexts, personhood emerges from the con-
stant reconciling of one with the other. The person
is thus to be taken as constituted of multiple identi-
ties, and as being a participant in a wide range of so-
cial relationships and groups based on locality, kin-
ship, ethnicity, occupation, religious and political af-
filiations and gender, as well as being intrinsically
related to the natural world in varied ways pheno-
menologically and ecologically (Morris 2000.47).
The recognition of ‘individualised’ personhood in
prehistory was recently associated with the indivi-
dual’s task-based skills and capacities. Chapman and
Gaydarska (2011; see also Budja 2011) introduce
the kinds of embodied skills and associated social
roles that created Mesolithic and Neolithic person-
hoods. They range from ‘hunting’ and ‘plant-gathe-
ring’ to ‘farming’ and ‘herding’; from ‘stone tool-ma-
king’ to ‘ploughing’ and ‘dairy producing’; from ‘bas-
ket-making and string-bag-making’ to ‘house-painting’
skills, etc. The acquisition and development of em-
bodied skills and their combinations and competen-
ces are key facets of a person’s individualisation and
participation in social life. The shift from dividual to
individual personhood is associated with transition
to farming and settlement nucleation, they suggest.
This namely leads to a wider diversity of persons
with different skills and their linkages to material
culture. On the other hand a greater likelihood of
new skills combinations leads to more individuali-
sed identities (Fig. 1).
The fractal person and Neolithic pottery frag-
mentation
Fractality is another perception of dividuality intro-
duced into anthropology by Roy Wagner (1991). He
creates this by converting Strathern’s notion of the
person, who is neither singular nor plural, into the
concept of the fractal person. The perception of frac-
tality is based on “holography and its fractal dimen-
sionality that replicates its figuration as part of the
fabric of the field, through all changes of scale”. He
postulates fractality in opposition to singularity and
plurality; and suggests that it “relates to, converts to
and reproduces the whole, something as different
from a sum as it is from an individual part” (ibid.
166). The basic premise of his work is that ‘the per-
son is a totality’ of which any aggregation is only a
partial realisation. Thus this totality is neither an in-
dividual nor a group, but a fractal person, an entity
whose (external) relationships with others are inte-
gral (internal) to it. He relates the fractal person to
the ‘great man’ system that “force[s] us to compre-
hend a pre-existing sociality, and a pre-existing to-
tality, of which any aggregate can be only a par-
tial realisation. This totality is neither individual
nor group but a ‘fractal person’, an entity whose
(external) relationships with others are integral
(internal) to it ... The task of the great man, then,
would not be one of upscaling individuals to ag-
gregate groupings but of keeping a scale that is
person and aggregate at once, solidifying a totali-
ty into happening” (ibid. 159, 172).
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The parallel conversion of the same notion of the
person has been effected within post-processual ar-
chaeology. John Chapman (1996; 2000a.28–29) po-
stulates that fractality relates to ‘the entity’ with in-
tegrally implied relationships, a person that aspires
to be individual and corporate at once. The ‘fractal
or dividual self’ is thus a person who is at the same
time individual and collective, connected to other
people through the extension of artefacts. The pos-
tulate is based on a sequence of premises which
Chapman anchored to Strathern’s (1987; 1988),
Wagner’s (1991) and Weiner’s (1992) notions that:
(i) ‘persons in gift societies become an artefact of
the way in which relationships are handled through
the possession and manipulation of things concep-
tualised as wealth or exchange’; (ii) ‘in these socie-
ties, a gift exchange is related to personal domina-
tion, and there inalienability and enchainment are
important’; (iii) ‘in some societies, inalienability de-
notes the absence of property relationship, so they
do not have alienable things at their disposal, and
they can only dispose of items by enchaining them-
selves in relations with others’; (iv) ‘enchainment is
a condition of all relations based on gift, and is thus
the means by which persons are multiply constitu-
ted’; (v) ‘inalienable things are the representations
of how social identities are reconstituted through
time’ (Chapman 2000a.28–32). Along with these
premises, he puts forward the idea of the blurred
human-object boundary by claiming that all things
with a cultural value are invested with life (see Wag-
ner 1991). That is, they partake of the self and also
create it. Valuable items thus take on part of the qua-
lities of their makers, just as the makers embody
qualities of skill and resourcefulness in the produc-
tion process. He actualises Daniel Miller’s (1985) sug-
gestion that artefacts are characterised as simulta-
neously a form of natural materials whose nature we
experience through practice and the form through
which we continually experience the particular na-
ture of our cultural order (e.g., the social relations
defining individuals and groups). He proposes that
the correlation between the use and deposition of
either complete or deliberately fragmented artefacts
and the enchained social relationships between per-
sons. While the fragmentation transmits enchained
or fractal ‘connotations of past makers and owners’,
the fragments of valued objects show the ‘extension
of persons’ relationships through the inalienability
of their valued objects and the transmission of frag-
ments to different individuals in different contexts’
(Chapman 2000a.39).
In this reading, pottery is suggested as a medium
that is ‘reliable and effective’ for holding persons
and groups together ‘through the objectification of
common traditions often reinforced by symbolic de-
coration’, and for providing ‘a mechanism for sym-
bolism of fission and rupture’. Thus complete pots
may represent group solidarity, integration and suc-
cessful constitution, whereas fragmented pots rep-
resent rupture, cleavage and friction that leads to
dissolution. In Early Neolithic societies, where hou-
sehold and/or local lineage institutions were weakly
developed, the only way to maintain social repro-
duction lay in repetitive social practices, including
pot smashing. Thus “the decision to keep pots whole
through daily use is a metaphor for maintenance
of social relations through continual renegotiation.
Just as the associations of its various uses bring
and added value to a vessel, so the enchainment of
fractal person to a ramifying group of kin brings
Fig. 1. A part of the Late Vin≠a figurine composition at Crkvine. It was suggested that the arrangement of
figurines represents the individuals (figurine) within a given community (composition), and each indi-
vidual role is marked by the tools and weapons (from Crnobrnja 2011.140, Fig. 9).
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such people fame and reputation. Conversely, the
rupture of those social relations characterising a
less sedentary community would have elicited the
response of the fragmentation of much valued pot-
tery. But the even more striking collapse of social
relations in a seemingly more stable sedentary
community’s may well have led to the large-scale
fragmentation of one of the that community’s im-
portant symbolic resources-pottery” (Chapman
2000a.43).
Along with the (fragmented) vessel that mediates
persons’ relationships between the living members
of society, the human bones are a metaphor for
maintaining relations between the living, the decea-
sed and the ancestors. The practice of bone remo-
val to selected domestic or mortuary contexts rede-
fines the social relations between the living and
those dead who become ancestors by keeping alive
the essence of the dead through the materiality of
their bones (Chapman 2000a.144; 2000b; Chap-
man, Gaydarska 2007.53–70).
Chapman’s model of personhood thus proposes that
the person is a totality of his or her relationships.
The fragmentation of objects and bodies, and the
extraction of parts from wholes and the re-articula-
tion of fragments in new units is the major mode of
social relations through which people and things are
constituted. People are not so much individuals as
‘dividuals’. Who they are and what they do relate to
their transactions with each other, with material cul-
ture and with the dead. His thesis pertains first to
Balkan Neolithic and Chalcolithic contexts. He ar-
gues that many incomplete artefacts, such as pots
and figurines, are the result of deliberate breakage,
dispersal and deposition. They were used in social
exchanges linking persons (dividuals), places and
things and, marking relational personhood. He pos-
tulated later that fragmentation and enchainment
are always linked social practices. Enchainment in
this context is believed to comprise the best, and so-
metimes the only, explanation for deliberate frag-
mentation (Chapman, Gaydarska 2007.203; Chap-
man 2008.188).3
In central and north-western Europe, the link be-
tween fragmentation and enchainment was recog-
nised in settlement and in burial Neolithic contexts
(Jones 2005.216). It has been suggested, however,
that the connections between people, places and
things are composed in quite different ways in dif-
ferent regions. In each of these cases, we have to be
careful about applying a unitary anthropological mo-
del of relational personhood, and we need to exa-
mine different ways of relating in different historical
contexts. Although there is no doubt that in many
prehistoric contexts, the deliberate fragmentation of
bodies and objects plays an important role in under-
standing identity (see Brück 2006; Nilsson Stutz
2003; Fowler 2008), the notion of the related pro-
cesses of fragmentation and enchainment has not
become broadly accepted in archaeology.
Criticism relates to the manner in which the frag-
mentation perspective is employed to generalise
about a single type of action (fragmentation) leading
via a single form of practice (enchainment) to a sin-
gle mode of relational (dividual) personhood, while
not allowing for the possibility of other readings
(Last 2007; Brittain, Harris 2010.590). Chris Fow-
ler (2004; 2008; 2010a; 2010b) instead proposes
that multiple forms of both dividual and individual
modes of personhood have been constituted through
different historical and material contexts. He sug-
gests that people in the past negotiated both indivi-
duality and dividuality in different ways within two
extremes, of Western individuality and eastern rela-
tional personhoods, but all societies provide frame-
works for people to negotiate features of both. In-
alienability, dividuality and fractal personhood are
thus merely parallel ways of describing the same
phenomenon on a very broad level, but there is also
a range of different strategies and logics of person-
hood that fall within the bounds of these terms (see
below). He suggests “a range of heuristics includ-
ing a broad tension between relational, dividual
and fractal personhood associated with inalienable
relations at one end of a spectrum, and fixed, in-
dividual personhood with representational meta-
phors and alienable relations at the other” (Fowler
2004.86).
A simpler approach to tracing and interpreting past
personhoods can be found in the discussions that
have run parallel in American anthropology. Porter
Poole (1994.842) thus suggests that personhood em-
bedded in processes of socialisation and encultura-
tion, “endows the culturally recognized individual
as a social being with those powers or capacities
upon which agency depends, makes possible and
constrains his or her proper actions, casts him or
3 The practices are hypothesised recently to be expected in ‘all hominin societies’ from the very first stone tool making (Knappett
2006; Gamble 2007.144; Chapman, Gaydarska 2009).
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her as possessed of understanding and judgement
... Although the capacities of personhood may be
anchored to the powers and limitations of the hu-
man body, they consist fundamentally of the cogni-
tive, emotional, motivational, evaluative and be-
havioural abilities that are entailed in becoming
an actor in community life. Thus, the person is es-
sentially a social being with a certain moral sta-
tus, is a legitimate bearer of rights and obligations,
and is endowed with those characteristics of agency
that make possible social action”. The discussion
actualised the Maussian triad of individual/self/per-
son as “biologistic, psychologistic, and sociologistic
modes” of conceptualising human beings, and diffe-
rentiates the individual as a member of human kind,
the self as a locus of experience, and the person as
an agent in society. To be a person, Grace Harris
(1989.602–605) postulates “it means to have a cer-
tain standing (not ‘status’) in a social order, as
agent-in-society. Consequently, it is not sufficient
to a discussion of personhood to talk about people
as centers of experience, selves. To be a person
means to be a ‘somebody’ who authors conduct
construed as action ... To focus on human persons
as agents-in-society directs attention to systems of
social relationships whose participants, perform-
ing actions and responding to each other’s actions,
live in a moral order”. Personhood has a temporal
dimension, and “moving through the moral career,
the human being may or may not become fully a
person. Even if he or she does become a person,
personhood may be partly or fully rescinded later.
His or her agentive capacities are bestowed or re-
moved, confirmed or disconfirmed, declared or de-
nied”.
Lewis Binford (1971) was the first to introduce the
anthropological concept of ‘social persona’ into ar-
chaeology, suggesting that mortuary customs and
beliefs were determined in part by representations
of the social identities of the individual, and in part
by the extent to which other members of the social
group recognised responsibilities to the deceased. It
is not only that as the number of social roles an in-
dividual held during life increased, so too would the
number of symbolic representations of those roles,
and that they would be adequately mirrored in the
treatment of the body, in grave architecture and in
grave goods, but also that the variation in the struc-
ture of mortuary data reflects the degree of social
structural complexity characterising the society it-
self. The presence of single rich burials has indeed
encouraged many archaeologists to construct linear
hierarchical models with individuals, chiefs, village
heads, located at particular levels in the social hier-
archy. Such a perspective increases the emphasis on
the powerful élite and individual identity and the
autonomy of male heads of lineage or chiefs control-
ling resources valued for their properties (Renfrew
1973). It is perhaps most obvious in Renfrew’s
(1974) interpretation of Neolithic and Bronze Age
societies as group-oriented and individualising chief-
doms, respectively. By the end of the 1970s, the in-
terpretative model that begins with an egalitarian
period among clan members in the earlier Neolithic,
followed by hierarchically organised lineages in the
later Neolithic, replaced by influential élite groups of
autonomous powerful Early Bronze Age male indi-
viduals who control the centralised exchange of pre-
stigious goods, was broadly accepted. Many authors
have argued that differences between burials in the
quantity and character of the grave goods indicate
that social position was based on the ability to ac-
quire and display prestige goods (e.g., Shennan 1982;
Bradley 1984; Thorpe, Richards 1984; Kristiansen
1998). It has been suggested that the beginning of
the Bronze Age correlates with the emergence of an
ideology of competitive individualism across Europe.
Individuals in these contexts were conceptualised as
a bounded, stable and independent entities existing
prior to and above the social relations into which
they enter. Applying these perceptions of self and
personhood, identified as modern Western and as-
sociated with an ideology of radical individualism of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries projected
onto the past, was strongly criticised (Brück 2001;
2006; 2009).
Heterogeneity of past identities
The concept of personhood has been intensively di-
scussed in prehistoric archaeology in the last decade.
Since the notion of ‘social persona’ appeared, the
debate on the relationship between (in)dividuals and
the societies of which they form part has had huge
implications for the study of identities in prehistory.
The numerous works that have been produced on
the topic reveal two opposite concepts of individual
person and personhood. The traditional perception
emphasises that individual person(hood) is a boun-
ded, stable and independent entity, constant from
birth, equal to others and unique. In post-procesual
archaeology, it represents an inherently fragmented,
fluid and relational entity. The person is ‘multiply-
authored’ by social interactions with others before
birth and throughout their lives (Brück 2005; 2006;
Fowler 2005; 2010a; 2010b; LiPuma 2001). How-
ever, in discussions on the relationship between the
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body and the person, in some cases the individual
focuses on the body, and the person is seen as a ma-
terial entity signified by the boundary of the body,
distinct from other individuals (Meskell 1996; Hod-
der 1999.138–146). In others, the person is seen to
be composed of relational transactions between and
with other persons and communities and thus con-
stituted through rationality. In Fowler’s (2004.4) de-
finition, a person is “any entity, human or other-
wise, which may be conceptualized and treated as
a person. A person is frequently composed through
the temporary association of different aspects.
These aspects may include features like mind, spi-
rit or soul as well as a physical body, and denote
the entity as having a form of agency. Exactly who
or what may or may not be a person is contextu-
ally variable”. Personhood, therefore, “refers to the
condition or state of being a person, as it is under-
stood in any specific context. Persons are consti-
tuted, de-constituted, maintained and altered in
social practices through life and after death. This
process can be described as the ongoing attain-
ment of personhood. Personhood is frequently un-
derstood as a condition that involves constant
change, and key transformations to the person oc-
cur throughout life and death. People may pass
from one state or stage of personhood to another.
Personhood is attained and maintained through
relationships not only with other human beings
but with things, places, animals and the spiritual
features of the cosmos. Some of these may also
emerge as persons through this engagement. Peo-
ple’s own social interpretations of personhood and
of the social practices through which personhood
is realized shape their interactions in a reflexive
way, but personhood remains a mutually constitu-
ted condition”.
Who or what may or may not be(come) a temporary
person is thus contextually variable, and what each
person is depends to a large extent on interactions
with other human beings and other beings and
things. Personhood is not a cumulative set of fixed,
distinguishing individual traits. It is a specific mar-
ker for the condition of identity as conceptualised
by a given community. The condition is understood
and formulated through different modes of person-
hood: individuality and indivisibility, dividuality,
partibility and fractality, and permeability. We men-
tioned above that individuality refers to the com-
mon concept of personal uniqueness that all persons
have, but it does not mean that individuals have an
indivisible nature. Indivisibility refers to a state of be-
ing indivisible, a unitary person. Dividuality relates
to a state where the person, the dividual, in this per-
ception is composite and multi-authored. Persons
engaged in social relationships with other beings
and things owe parts of themselves to others. The
person is thus composed of traits or features such as
mind, soul, and body that may have different origins
or authorships. Partibility, fractality and permeabi-
lity are synonyms of the dividual person and person-
hood.
Partibility refers to the reconfiguration of the divi-
dual person in a way that one part or element can
be subtracted and given to another person or entity,
to whom or which it is owed. Being a multiply con-
stituted person composed of diverse relations makes
him, her or it a partible entity, an agent that can dis-
pose of parts or act as a separate part. Melanesian
societies are often cited as prime examples: women
move in marriage as parts of clans, but men circulate
objectified parts of themselves among themselves.
The latter refers to the person and personhood as
permeated by flows of substances, e.g., qualities that
influence the internal composition of the person.
Hindu societies in south India are conceived as per-
meable persons.
Fractality and the fractal person encapsulate the per-
sonhood of partibility and multiple composition that
are repeated on different scales, from particular per-
sons to larger social groups, clans and lineages, ex-
tending from living to non-living beings. Through
fractal logic, groups of people may appear as one
person constituted through the same relations as
single members of the community. In communities
where personhood is stressed as a feature of the
community and where a clan is a person (a family
might be another), not all persons in the community
are necessarily human, but other social agents such
as ‘ghosts, spirits, houses, axes, animals, standing
stones’ (for details see Fowler 2004.14–30).
Personhood thus objectifies how identities shift con-
tinuously throughout life and how they are media-
ted either through small interactions between a few
people or large community events, through cooking,
eating and commensality, through death and decom-
position, and through mortuary exchanges and an-
cestral ceremonies. All these dynamics are embedded
in systems of totemism, animism and naturalism. In
a relational world, personhood can be attained and
understood only through transactions between peo-
ple, and between people and things, substances, buil-
dings, animals and other entities. In some social prac-
tices, the statuses of humans and animals are inter-
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connected through transformations in personhood.
In others, the decomposition of bodies and redistri-
bution of body parts and bones are vital to the cir-
culation of energy among all living things. We may
hypothesise the life and after-life of a person as an
ongoing process in which different personhoods are
sought, negotiated and attained. Personhood is not,
therefore, a cumulative set of fixed, distinguishing
personality traits. LiPuma (2001.131) and Fowler
(2005.123) agree that in all cultures both individual
and dividual aspects of personhood co-exist. Each
person negotiates a tension between these aspects,
especially in constructing his or her own compara-
tive discourses, such as justifications or explanations
for action. In all societies, personhood emerges from
a constant process of reconciliation of one with the
other, and it is a misunderstanding to assume either
that the social emerges out of individual action or
that the individual ever completely disappears by
virtue of indigenous forms of relational totalisation.
Recent discussions in archaeology have focused on
the hypothesised trajectory of the Early Neolithic di-
vidual to Early Bronze Age individual personhood.
It is broadly accepted that during the Early Bronze
Age the treatment of the body changed as collective
burials were replaced by single inhumations and cre-
mations in well-defined graves in Atlantic Europe.
Mortuary practices were different from the previous
Neolithic, and it has been suggested that this defines
a new relationship between the living and the dead,
along with a perception of the body as a distinct enti-
ty (Thomas 1991; Jones 2002). The burials of impres-
sive and symbolically significant prestigious goods
such as toiletry articles, weapons and drinking equip-
ment (common to individual graves) with male bo-
dies evoke the aesthetics of maleness that relate to
the role of the male warrior. It is associated with par-
ticular lifestyles in which warfare, body ornamenta-
tion, hunting, horses and the consumption of alco-
hol on the one hand, and control of the centralised
exchange of prestigious goods and hereditary posi-
tions of power on the other, which it has been sug-
gested are expressions of self-identity in the Early
Bronze Age (Treherne 1995). The warrior’s indivi-
dual personhood remains broadly recognised as an
archetype of both powerful elites and individual
chiefs’ identity (for a critical discussion, see Brück
2004; Fowler 2005).
The moral codex of rules and standards that relates
to the notion of the warrior’s personhood at the on-
set of the Mycenaean period was introduced into the
discussion recently (Voutsaki 2010). When indivi-
duals as described by Homer in the Iliad and Odys-
sey first engage in a practice, they have no choice
but to agree to accept external standards for the eva-
luation of their acts and to agree to follow the ru-
les set out for practice. The main purpose of human
agency in heroic societies, where the warrior is the
paradigm of human excellence, is to realise the
goods internal to practices such as fighting, hunting
or feasting. The entire group thus ‘celebrates a vic-
torious battle’, ‘benefits from a successful hunting
expedition’ or ‘enjoys a generous feast’ to increase
the prestige of the kin and social group, and to en-
sure the fidelity and reliability of fighting compa-
nions and allies. A moral agent is necessarily a so-
cial agent in so far as his perception must match that
of the group. Morality and social structure in heroic
society are thus conflated (MacIntyre 2007). Moral
standards are always bound up with society as a
whole and differ between societies according to each
society’s respective structure. Each individual has a
fixed role resulting from their position in the social
network, primarily through their particular ties to
an elite community, and each individual has the spe-
cific obligations and privileges attached to that po-
sition. The warrior’s personhood was thus individual
and dividual, and as we mentioned above, the iden-
tity of the group and the person can have parallel
compositions and can move between parallel con-
ditions of personhood.
We suggest a similar reading of shamanic identitiy
in a much earlier Mesolithic hunter-gatherer context
in northern Europe. Four shaft graves at Oleneos-
trovskii Mogilnik contained shaman burials that are
significantly different from the other burials in terms
of grave architecture, treatment of the body and
grave goods (O’Shea, Zvelebil 1984; Larson 2004;
Zvelebil 2008). In contrast to the other 173 graves
facing east, these four are shaft graves oriented to
the west. They include two males, one female, and
one juvenile in a vertical (reclining) position. In the
most elaborate shaft burial (No. 100), of a middle-
aged man, more than 500 artefacts were placed ca-
refully over and around his body, particularly around
the head and shoulders, the pelvic region, and be-
low the knees. This arrangement suggests that some
of the pendants were attached to what were perhaps
a garment and possibly a headdress. The man was
equipped with a quiver that held arrows and a large
bone dagger with flint inserts. Beaver mandibles
were placed on the body suggesting a shaman’s at-
tribute, since beaver mandibles form part of sha-
mans’ attire among some Siberian groups. The body
was buried in a deep, almost vertical pit. The pit was
tion debate in archaeology. World Archaeology 42(4):
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covered in ochre, and the body was
walled in with large stones. It has
been suggested that the deceased
was partially exposed for viewing
(Stoliar 2001) (Fig. 2).
Exceptional individual burials attri-
buted to shamans have been found
in several hunter-gatherer cemeter-
ies in northern Europe (Janislawice
in Poland, Duonkalnis in Lithuania,
Vedbæk-Bogebakken, Zvejnieki, Ska-
teholm, Hartikka and Pispa in south-
ern Finland, and Tudozero in north-
ern Russia). They all include inter-
ments that are significantly different
from standard practice. All the bu-
rials are embedded in egalitarian fra-
meworks, but demonstrate the indi-
vidual status of the deceased and so-
cial rank and differentiation to some
degree based on achieved, perhaps
even inherited, status and wealth
(Zvelebil 2008). Shamanic agency,
on the other hand, relates them to totemic cosmo-
logy and animistic practices that dictate relations
between humans, ancestors and animals. It can be
seen in a continuous flow of substances, human (an-
cestral) bones and animal body parts between per-
sons (Ingold 1986; 2000a; 2000b; Strassburg 2000;
Nilsson Stutz 2003). We may assume that a dividual
shaman’s personhood was attained and maintained
through relationships not only with animals, places
and spiritual features, but with lineages or clans to
the same extent. Both Mesolithic shamans and Bronze
Age warriors are persons to be taken as constituted
of multiple forms of both dividual and individual
modes of personhood, and as participants in a wide
range of social relationships and groups.
Fig. 2. Oleneostrovskii Mogilnik burial No. 100 (from Gurina 1956.
Figs. 13, 50). The body was buried in a vertical (reclining) position
in an almost vertical pit. The pit was covered in ochre, and the body
was walled in with large stones.
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